Tuesday, February 12, 2013

Edmund Phelps trashes rational expectations

I'm not generally one to enjoy reading interviews with macroeconomists, but this one is an exception. Published yesterday in Bloomberg, it features an interview by Caroline Baum of Edmund Phelps, Nobel Prize winner for his work on the relationship between inflation and unemployment. This focus of the interview is on Phelp's views of the rational expectations revolution. He is not a big fan:
Q (Baum): So how did adaptive expectations morph into rational expectations?

A (Phelps): The "scientists" from Chicago and MIT came along to say, we have a well-established theory of how prices and wages work. Before, we used a rule of thumb to explain or predict expectations: Such a rule is picked out of the air. They said, let's be scientific. In their mind, the scientific way is to suppose price and wage setters form their expectations with every bit as much understanding of markets as the expert economist seeking to model, or predict, their behavior. The rational expectations approach is to suppose that the people in the market form their expectations in the very same way that the economist studying their behavior forms her expectations: on the basis of her theoretical model.

Q: And what's the consequence of this putsch?

A: Craziness for one thing. You’re not supposed to ask what to do if one economist has one model of the market and another economist a different model. The people in the market cannot follow both economists at the same time. One, if not both, of the economists must be wrong. Another thing: It’s an important feature of capitalist economies that they permit speculation by people who have idiosyncratic views and an important feature of a modern capitalist economy that innovators conceive their new products and methods with little knowledge of whether the new things will be adopted -- thus innovations. Speculators and innovators have to roll their own expectations. They can’t ring up the local professor to learn how. The professors should be ringing up the speculators and aspiring innovators. In short, expectations are causal variables in the sense that they are the drivers. They are not effects to be explained in terms of some trumped-up causes.

Q: So rather than live with variability, write a formula in stone!

A: What led to rational expectations was a fear of the uncertainty and, worse, the lack of understanding of how modern economies work. The rational expectationists wanted to bottle all that up and replace it with deterministic models of prices, wages, even share prices, so that the math looked like the math in rocket science. The rocket’s course can be modeled while a living modern economy’s course cannot be modeled to such an extreme. It yields up a formula for expectations that looks scientific because it has all our incomplete and not altogether correct understanding of how economies work inside of it, but it cannot have the incorrect and incomplete understanding of economies that the speculators and would-be innovators have.
I think this is exactly the issue: "fear of uncertainty". No science can be effective if it aims to banish uncertainty by theoretical fiat. And this is what really makes rational expectations economics stand out as crazy when compared to other areas of science and engineering. It's a short interview, well worth a quick read.

Highly ironic also that, nearly half a century after Lucas and others began pushing this stuff, the trend is now back toward "adaptive expectations." Is rational expectations anything other than an expensive 50 year diversion into useless nonsense?

Monday, February 11, 2013

New Theme, Currency Realignment


You know you will be trying to stop a moving train when G20 issues statements such as "we must avoid currency devaluations". Already, Japan has started to climb out of a coma and they saw immediate benefits in the stock market and more importantly money started to flow again. The contraction recession in Japan has been strangling the economy for more than 20 years. Finally, first time in my career I see them doing something effective. To think that I started my career at Nomura Securities, the biggest broker in the world then, it has certainly come full circle. 

What does currency realignment mean? Once a major currency realigns, it will attract a lot of dissension from other trading partners competing in the same grouping. Just when the euro seems to have found the elixir to rebound from a sustained weakness, now comes the yen's weakness. The two main partners to complain would be the US and EU, especially at the top of the production and manufacturing chain. Autos and electrical products manufacturers are the most directly affected.
Even major trading partners exporting to Japan will be complaining on the currency shift, but all will good. We need the realignment, we need money to move, we need to rebalance intra-competitiveness for a vibrant global economy. 
So how will it affect markets? In the initial phase, it will boost the country directly benefiting from the devaluation, in this case Japan. Already now, I am certain that the US does not want the yen to drop any further, but it will and that will cause the USD to weaken a little as well. This will also cause the euro to die on its strengthening bid. The secondary phase is that it will benefit all markets as devaluation brings forth more compelling valuations and inflow of funds to buy stocks. Capital flows will also move to rebalance and invest in countries whose currency are strengthening as a safe haven or to ride on the currency, but they will not benefit as much as the devalued countries.
Having said that, it should be a very vibrant and bullish 3 months ahead (except for Malaysia with its elections) as it won't be a totally zero sum game. Can all markets gain at the same time? Yes because there has been too much money and liquidity pumped into the system and the bulk of it is still residing in bonds and money market. The shifts in currency valuations, and the fierce pronouncement by Federal Reserve in keeping liquidity ample for quite a long time, and the willingness of the new regime in Japan to weaken the yen, plus the superhero feats by Draghi to drag the euro from oblivion to safety by "hope and prayer" alone ... all points to super bullish trend in global equities.
-----------------------------------------------
from Bloomberg:
The Group of 20 nations must avoid currency devaluations aimed at increasing competitiveness and promote more transparency in exchange rates, the U.S. Treasury Department’s top international official said.
“The G-20 needs to deliver on the commitment to move to market-determined exchange rates and refrain from competitive devaluation,” Lael Brainard, the Treasury’s undersecretary for international affairs, said at a news conference in Washington today. Brainard said “global growth is weak and vulnerable to the downside,” and strengthening demand must be a top priority for G-20 finance ministers and central bankers meeting in Moscow Feb. 15-16.
Lael Brainard, under secretary of the Treasury for international affairs, said she supports the effort in Japan to end deflation and “reinvigorate growth. It will be important that structural reforms accompany macroeconomic policies to achieve these goals.” Photographer: Andrew Harrer/Bloomberg
Brainard said she supports the effort in Japan to end deflation and “reinvigorate growth. It will be important that structural reforms accompany macroeconomic policies to achieve these goals.”
The Group of Seven nations are considering saying they won’t target exchange rates when setting policy as they try to calm concern that the world is on the brink of a so-called currency war, two officials from G-7 countries said.

Exchange Rates

Finance officials from the world’s key industrial economies have drafted a statement on currencies now being reviewed by senior policy makers, they said on condition of anonymity. The current wording, which still may be changed, combines the traditional backing for market-set exchange rates with a new line that governments don’t direct fiscal or monetary policy at driving currencies, one aide said.
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s push for more aggressive monetary policy has raised concern abroad that his government is directly seeking to weaken the yen, something it denies.
Japan has been criticized for driving down the yen by officials from South Korea to Russia in the run-up to the G-20 meeting. Abe administration officials have said that they are focused on ending deflation, rather than seeking a specific level for the yen.
Haruhiko Kuroda, the head of the Asian Development Bank and a potential contender for Bank of Japan chief, said in an interview that the BOJ could usher in a growth spurt unseen in a generation by stepping up stimulus and ending deflation.

Currency Policies

Brainard, when asked whether the G-7 will release a statement on currency polices, said the group remains in close communication and she expects its members “will continue to adhere to the longstanding agreements that we have.” Those accords “importantly include a commitment to floating exchange rates, with very rare exceptions in cases that excess volatility or disorderly movements might warrant cooperation,” she said.
Brainard, who will attend the Moscow meetings, said China needs to “further boost household demand and reinvigorate the move to a market-determined exchange rate and interest rates.” She also said it’s important for Europe “to come together around a joint strategy that supports growth.”

Dairy Of A Reluctant Bear.

It has been a while I posted in the blog. But the fact is, there has not been much to write home about.
We were long for the whole month of January and when SPX started flirting with 1510, we exit all long positions and have been in the sideline since then.
The indices have been chopping and churning and grinding higher very slowly. In the process, killing all bears and convincing everyone else to BTFD
Sentiments are at all time high:
And indices are in the overbought territory.
However, overbought can remain overbought for a long time, till no one is left to sell and everyone is a buyer. When we start hearing about SPX 1600, we will know that the gig is up.

So we are not front running. Subscribers know the levels to watch and when the sell signal will trigger. Knowing those critical levels have helped us to avoid the whipsaws. We are watching VIX very closely and that is another of our indicators.

We have also stayed away from commodities including PMs and while we did not short it, we fully anticipated the sell off in gold and silver. Now we are waiting for the sell signal in oil and Nat. Gas. There is no play in grains or soft commodities either.

All in all, we are practising patience and keeping our emotional health in good shape. Not to mention preserving our capital as well.

Hope you all are having fun in this BTFD market and although I have turned into a reluctant bear, I am now a patient bear waiting for the fish to land in my mouth.
Good luck trading everyone.

Sunday, February 10, 2013

Let there be light

*** UPDATE BELOW***

My Bloomberg column this month looks at an idea for improving the function of the interbank lending market. The idea is radical, yet also conceptually very simple. It's radical because it proposes a complete transformation of banking transparency. It shows how transparency may be the best route to achieving overall banking stability and efficiency. It will be interesting to see what free-market ideologues think of the idea, as it doesn't fit into any standard ideological narrative such as "get government out of the way" or "unregulated markets work best." It offers a means to improve market function -- something one would expect free-market cheerleaders to favor -- but does so in a way that threatens banking secrecy and also involves some central coordination.

My column was necessarily vague on detail given its length, so let me give some more discussion here. The paper presenting the ideas is this one by Stefan Thurner and Sebastian Poledna. It is first important to recognize that they consider here not all markets, but specifically the interbank market, in which banks loan funds to one another to manage demands for liquidity. This is the market that famously froze up following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, as banks suddenly realized they had no understanding at all of the risks facing potential counterparties. The solution proposed by Thurner and Poledna strikes directly at such uncertainty, by offering a mechanism to calculate those risks and make them available to everyone.

Here's the basic logic of their argument. They start with the point that standard theories of finance operate on the basis of wholly unrealistic assumptions about the ability of financial institutions to assess their risks rationally. Even if the individuals at these institutions were rational, the overwhelming complexity of today's market makes it impossible to judge systemic risks because of a lack of information:
Since the beginning of banking the possibility of a lender to assess the riskiness of a potential borrower has been essential. In a rational world, the result of this assessment determines the terms of a lender-borrower relationship (risk-premium), including the possibility that no deal would be established in case the borrower appears to be too risky. When a potential borrower is a node in a lending-borrowing network, the node’s riskiness (or creditworthiness) not only depends on its financial conditions, but also on those who have lending-borrowing relations with that node. The riskiness of these neighboring nodes depends on the conditions of their neighbors, and so on. In this way the concept of risk loses its local character between a borrower and a lender, and becomes systemic.

The assessment of the riskiness of a node turns into an assessment of the entire financial network [1]. Such an exercise can only carried out with information on the asset-liablilty network. This information is, up to now, not available to individual nodes in that network. In this sense, financial networks – the interbank market in particular – are opaque. This intransparency makes it impossible for individual banks to make rational decisions on lending terms in a financial network, which leads to a fundamental principle: Opacity in financial networks rules out the possibility of rational risk assessment, and consequently, transparency, i.e. access to system-wide information is a necessary condition for any systemic risk management.
In this connection, recall Alan Greenspan's famous admission that he had trusted in the ability of rational bankers to keep markets working by controlling their counterparty risk. As he exclaimed in 2006,
"Those of us who have looked to the self-interest of lending institutions to protect shareholder's equity -- myself especially -- are in a state of shocked disbelief."
The trouble, at least partially, is that no matter how self-interested those lending institutions were, they couldn't possibly have made the staggeringly complex calculations required to assess those risks accurately. The system is too complex. They lacked necessary information. Hence, as Thurner and Poledna point out, we might help things by making this information more transparent.

The question then becomes: is it possible to do this? Well, here's one idea. As the authors point out, much of the information that would be required to compute the systemic risks associated with any one bank is already reported to central banks, at least in developed nations. No private party has this information. No single investment bank has this information. Perhaps even no single central bank has this information. But central banks together do have it, and they could use it to perform a calculation of considerably value (again, in the context of the interbank market):
In most developed countries interbank loans are recorded in the ‘central credit register’ of Central Banks, that reflects the asset-liability network of a country [5]. The capital structure of banks is available through standard reporting to Central Banks. Payment systems record financial flows with a time resolution of one second, see e.g. [6]. Several studies have been carried out on historical data of asset-liability networks [7–12], including overnight markets [13], and financial flows [14].

Given this data, it is possible (for Central Banks) to compute network metrics of the asset-liability matrix in real-time, which in combination with the capital structure of banks, allows to define a systemic risk-rating of banks. A systemically risky bank in the following is a bank that – should it default – will have a substantial impact (losses due to failed credits) on other nodes in the network. The idea of network metrics is to systematically capture the fact, that by borrowing from a systemically risky bank, the borrower also becomes systemically more risky since its default might tip the lender into default. These metrics are inspired by PageRank, where a webpage, that is linked to a famous page, gets a share of the ‘fame’. A metric similar to PageRank, the so-called DebtRank, has been recently used to capture systemic risk levels in financial networks [15].
I wrote a little about this DebtRank idea here. It's a computational algorithm applied to a financial network which offers a means to assess systemic risks in a coherent, self-consistent way; it brings network effects into view. The technical details aren't so important, but the original paper proposing the notion is here. The important thing is that the DebtRank algorithm, along with the data provided to central banks, makes it possible in principle to calculate a good estimate of the overall systemic risk presented by any bank in the network. 

So imagine this: central banks around the world get together tomorrow, and within a month or so manage to coordinate their information flows (ok, maybe that's optimistic). They set up some computers to run the calculations, and a server to host the results, which would be updated every day, perhaps even hourly. Soon you or I or any banker in the world could go to some web site and in a few seconds read out the DebtRank score for any bank in the developed world, and also to see the listing of banks ranked by the systemic risks they present. Wouldn't that be wonderful? Even if central banks took no further steps, this alone would be a valuable project, using global information to produce a globally valuable information resource for everyone. (Notice also that publishing DebtRank scores isn't the same as publishing all the data that banks supply to their central banks. That level of detail could be kept secret, with only the single measure of overall systemic risk being published.)

I would hope that almost everyone would be in favor of such a project or something like it. Of course, one group would be dead set against it -- those banks who have the highest DebtRank scores because they are systemically the most risky. But their private concerns shouldn't trump the public interest in reducing such risks. Measuring and making such numbers public is the first step in making any such reduction.

But Thurner and Poledna do go further in making a specific proposal for using this information in a sensible way to reduce systemic risks. Here's how that works. Banks in the interbank market borrow funds for varying amounts of time from other banks. Typically, there's a standard interbank interest rate prevailing for all banks (as far as I understand). Hence, a bank looking to borrow doesn't really have much preference as to which bank it finds as a lender; the interest paid will be the same. But if the choice of lender doesn't matter to the borrowing bank, it does matter a lot to the rest of us, as borrowing from a systemically risky bank threatens the financial system. If the borrower can't pay back, that risky bank could be put into distress and cause trouble for the system at large. So, we really should have banks in the interbank market looking to borrow first from the least systemically risky banks, i.e. from those with low values of DebtRank.

This is what Thurner and Poledna propose. Let central banks regulate that borrowers in the interbank market do just that -- seek out the least risky banks first as lenders. In this way, banks acting to take on lots of systemic risk would thereby be marked as too dangerous to make further loans. Further borrowing would instead be undertaken by less risky banks, thereby improving the spread of risks across the system. Don't trust in the miracle of the free market to make this happen -- it won't -- but step in and provide a mechanism for it to happen. As the authors describe it:
The idea is to reduce systemic risk in the IB network by not allowing borrowers to borrow from risky nodes. In this way systemically risky nodes are punished, and an incentive for nodes is established to be low in systemic riskiness. Note, that lending to a systemically dangerous node does not increase the systemic riskiness of the lender. We implement this scheme by making the DebtRank of all banks visible to those banks that want to borrow. The borrower sees the DebtRank of all its potential lenders, and is required (that is the regulation part) to ask the lenders for IB loans in the order of their inverse DebtRank. In other words, it has to ask the least risky bank first, then the second risky one, etc. In this way the most risky banks are refrained from (profitable) lending opportunities, until they reduce their liabilities over time, which makes them less risky. Only then will they find lending possibilities again. This mechanism has the effect of distributing risk homogeneously through the network.
The overall effect in the interbank market would be -- in an idealized model, at least -- to make systemic banking collapses much less likely. Thurner and Poledna ran a number of agent-based simulations to test out the dynamics of such a market, with encouraging results. The model involves banks, firms and households and their interactions; details in the paper for those interested. Bottom line, as illustrated in the figure below, is that cascading defaults through the banking system become much less likely. Here the red shows the statistical likelihood over many runs of banking cascades of varying size (number of banks involved) when borrowing banks choose their counterparties at random; this is the "business as usual" situation, akin to the market today. In contrast, the green and blue show the same distribution if borrowers instead sought counterparties so as to avoid those with high values of DebtRank (green and blue for slightly different conditions). Clearly, system wide problems become much less likely.



Another way to put it is this: banks currently have no incentive whatsoever, when seeking to borrow, to avoid borrowing from banks that play systemically important roles in the financial system. They don't care who they borrow from. But we do care, and we could easily force them -- using information that is already collected -- to borrow in a more responsible, safer way. Can there be any argument against that?

What are the chances for such a sensible idea to be put into practice? I have no idea. But I certainly hope these ideas make it quickly onto the radar of people at the new Office for Financial Research.

**UPDATE**
A reader emailed to alert me to this blog he runs which champions the idea of "ultra transparency" as a means for ensuring greater stability in finance. At face value, it makes a lot of sense and I think that the work I wrote about today fits into this perspective very well. The idea is simply that governments can provide information resources to the markets which would support better decisions by everyone in reckoning risks and rewards. Of course, we need independent people and firms gathering information in a decentralized way. But that isn't enough. In today's hypercomplex markets, some of the risks are simply invisible to anyone lacking vast quantities of data and the means to analyze them. Only governments currently have the requisite access to such information.  

Wednesday, February 6, 2013

Rakyat Untuk Malaysia

Friends tell me I have been more political of late. I say, I haven't changed one bit. Malaysians are very cunning in that they would rather not let anyone know of their political leanings. Ask ourselves, why are we scared to say which party we support? Why is that kind of fear prevailing among us? When one side controls or owns the mainstream media, be it popular dailies or TV stations, that in itself is a powerful weapon. 50 years is a long time, how many more decades do we have? For this CNY holidays, talk to your relatives and friends, make sure they vote, I don't mind if they vote for BN but as long as they vote. Stand and be counted.

Some people say we are not certain of the opposition knows how to govern. Governing is not difficult. I am not saying PKR will be a wonderful government, but at least something different for a two party system to evolve. Even if PKR does a bad job, when/if BN returns they will at least come back as a "better alternative".

 ... but just look at the sacrifices, sufferings, humiliation, victimisation suffered by Anwar, Guan Eng and Kit Siang, just to name a few ... why are they doing what they do, for whom are they doing all that ... and if we still have the heart in us to just keep quiet and be a bystander, then for sure the country is going to the dumps. We cannot be selfish and let others do the fighting for us while we stay on the sidelines and reap the benefits while others are championing for our rights and justice. We have but one life, we have but one country, let's move forward together.


Too Cute

Baby sleeps till the parents play the baby's favourite song. Her sister's just as adorable.